1. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, trans. Douglas Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 39, for one translation.
2. I continue to draw my language from Nietzsche's Second Essay loosely from the Smith translation. In "Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow," one of Cavell's main textual coordinates in Nietzsche is from his 1886 preface to Human, All Too Human, which sardonically calls Geschwätz the topics that ought to silence the philosopher: Geschwätz, "chatter," or Literatur. 7 In the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche asks how we can find ourselves if we do not even seek ourselves. "We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers." If, for Cavell, Nietzsche's prose takes on the recognizable role of maximizing the expression of discontent with the world of existing, lawful, philosophical systems and social institutions, and positions literature as the properly mute-perhaps maddening, perhaps idle-antinomy to such institutions, Jane Austen occupies a position that I think most readers would not expect of her novels, in this broadly romantic dialogue about the philosophical, social, and aesthetic conditions of expressive relation. Austen provides not a foil to Nietzsche's passion (or speaking biographically, even to his threat of isolation and madness) but signals an alternate scope and key for its expression of "spiritual distress" 8 -something like a "piano" key of the brash philosophy of the Übermorgen-that substantiates the claim of desire, or least makes for its underscoring. A basic idea that I take from Cavell's interest in Austen and in what he calls, in Contesting Tears, the "feminine voice" is that philosophy can have a means of emphasis that does not work by just making the object or point of emphasis bolder. The sympathetic critical disposition toward such a voice articulates a place for the livable (to that extent "realist") literary mood in (his) philosophy.
Nietzsche sets the task as to "breed an animal with the right to make promises," or who "may make promises"; and Cavell, precisely, is interested in Austen (and in George Eliot) in this chapter as writers not only of constrained, or unheroic, passions and of extracted consent, but of "good breeding." 9 Cavell reads Austen's work under the movingly exigent heading of Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow as a whole, in the urgent, sobering project appropriate to his life after retirement from teaching at Harvard as well as to the remaining scope of hyperbolic expression as Nietzsche's: the joyful, cheerful, but also stressed-out, desperate, shrieking and "zany" styles of Nietzsche's writing with "spurs." 14 It is true that Jane Austen's prose style is almost never manic, outside of a couple moments in Persuasion and in the boisterous juvenilia. In fact, in the lecture version of "Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow," Cavell stunningly calls the "surface" of her prose style one of "lethal calm." He narrates his "late" fascination with her novels as a response not to their "elation" and "thrill" of identification in the main marriage plots, but in response to "the stupidity, the silliness, the empty-headedness, the quality of being worn-out…of so many of her supporting players." 15 (Cavell does not mention particular characters, but I find it instructive and paradoxically enlivening to build the list of these "players," which must include the menacing boor and rattle 26. "How right is the saying," is one possible translation that has been used. 27. See Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 122-123. 28. Does this affirmation of the contingent and not-fully agential self mean to depart from Nietzsche's expression of the man-animal who "promises like a sovereign-seriously, seldom, slowly-who is sparing with his trust, who confers distinction when he trusts" (On the Genealogy of Morals, 41)? Nietzsche's sovereign promise is bound by and takes its force not merely from psychic and physiological memory but from what he calls "a real memory of the will": "This development is not merely the result of a passive inability to rid oneself of an impression once etched on the mind, nor of the incapacity to digest a once-given word with which one is never through, but represents rather an active will not to let go, an ongoing willing of what was once willed, a real memory of the will: so that between the original 'I will,' 'I shall do,' and the actual realization of the will, its enactment, a world of new and strange things, circumstances, even other acts of will may safely intervene, without causing this long chain of the will to break" (ibid., 40). Having myself written a book on romantic fiat that considered in this more or less theological way how language not only exists but attaches the world (and us? philosophers? poets? to the world), I now put forth perlocution as the major alternative way to reconsider this question of affective movement, sequels, and the being and attachment of language to the world, as well as the intersubjective zone of actual language users in confrontation and exchange. The displacement of the unmoved mover of causation that drives the classic theological way of thought perhaps can still be recognized in its change into the question of how responsibility, the over-and underdetermination of cause on passion, "direct" or "indirect," adequate or no, appears as a crucial but unsolvable issue in forming any system of perlocution. 31 Like the fiat, perlocution is performative and evental language, but unlike the fiat (or even its Colerid- allow for irony-free seriousness; but readers of Cavell might find they just can't maintain it. Cavell maps out the necessary conditions of passionate utterance:
I propose that something corresponding to what Austin lists as the six necessary conditions (he sometimes calls them rules) for the felicity of performative utterance holds for passionate utterance. Austin's are (1) there must exist a conventional procedure for uttering certain words in certain contexts, (2) the particular persons and circumstances must be appropriate for the invocation of the procedure, (3) the procedure must be executed correctly and (4) completely, (5) where the procedure requires certain thoughts or feelings or intentions for the inauguration of consequential conduct, the parties must have those feelings or thoughts and intend so to conduct themselves, and further (6) actually so conduct themselves subsequently. Now in the case of passionate speech, in questioning or confronting you with your conduct, all this is overturned, but specifically and in detail.
There is (Austin notes) no conventional procedure for appealing to you to act in response to my expression of passion (of outrage at your treachery or callousness, of jealousy over your attentions, of hurt over your slights of recognition). Call this absence of convention the first condition of passionate utterance; and let's go further. Whether, then, I have the standing to appeal to or to question you-to single you out as the object of my passion-is part of the argument to ensue. Call standing and singling out the second and third conditions of passionate utterance. These conditions for felicity, or say appropriateness, are not given a priori but are to be discovered or refined, or else the effort to articulate it is to be denied. There is no question therefore of executing a procedure correctly and completely, but there are further unshiftable demands, or rules, that (fourth) the one uttering a passion must have the passion, and (fifth) the one singled out must respond now and here, and (sixth) respond in kind, that is to say, be moved to respond, or else resist the demand. 38 In "Performative and Passionate Utterance," Cavell reviews the perlocutionary conditions (if anything) more systematically, before adding this seventh "rule": I add to this list, registering a final asymmetry: 39 In another project I examine two literary texts (poems and a letter on poetics), by Claudia Rankine and Keats, which put a curious kind of pressure on a few of these conditions: namely, that "the one singled out must respond now and here, and (sixth) respond in kind, that is to say, be moved to respond, or else resist the demand" (emphasis added); with the amplification of the last "rule" in its apparent neutralization in the questioning, denial, dismissal, postponement, or unavailability of "further means of response." Cavell in The Claim of Reason articulates a way in which to respond to the suffering of others, despite the unavailability of the subject in the moment, which allows "freedom for a further response." Cavell's romantic perfectionism allows for the fluctuating (non-) succession as the future, or sequel to this realm of further responsiveness beyond stable predication. The generous outward gesture, which Cavell extends not only to future readers, but to dead literary authors and toward himself too, lies in disburdening the (near) affective nullity from its added burden of pressing and disabling shame to allow space to experience both "another's misery [as] unforgettable" and for "freedom for a further response" in oneself. 40 Yet here in the context of this essay and its treatment of the Literary Cavell, as opposed to the scene of face to face conversation through which Cavell insistently models his thinking on perlocution, it must suffice to notice the alignment of Cavell's perlocutionary condition #7 with key aspects of the space of literature itself: with the ques- this problem" of breeding the promise-making animal "has been solved must seem all the more surprising to someone who fully appreciates the countervailing force of forgetfulness" as an "active…positive…inhibiting capacity, responsible for the fact" that we can absorb and return the contact of experience, take part in conversation and confrontation, and respond to the word's touch. 42 The very opacity of perlocution to Cavell leaves me. In Hamacher's philological thesis is the idea that we want, we are tasked, to go beyond the model of language as predication, but that we cannot do so through a simple irreversible act or wish-for the former is exposed as "violent," the latter identified as "utopian" or pious. In Austin's "A Plea for Excuses," we see not on- 
